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Abstract 
 This study tests assertions that Economic Value Added (EVA®) is more highly 
associated with stock returns and firm values than accrual earnings, and evaluates which 
components of EVA, if any, contribute to these associations.  Relative information content tests 
reveal earnings to be more highly associated with returns and firm values than EVA, residual 
income, or cash flow from operations.  Incremental tests suggest that EVA components add only 
marginally to information content beyond earnings.  Considered together, these results do not 
support claims that EVA dominates earnings in relative information content, and suggest rather 
that earnings generally outperforms EVA. 
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Does EVA® beat earnings?  Evidence on associations 
with stock returns and firm values 
 
1. Introduction and motivation  
 For centuries, economists have reasoned that for a firm to create wealth it must earn more 
than its cost of debt and equity capital (Hamilton, 1777; Marshall, 1890).  In the twentieth 
century, this concept has been operationalized under various labels including residual income.1 
Residual income has been recommended as an internal measure of business-unit performance 
(Solomons, 1965) and as an external performance measure for financial reporting (Anthony, 
1973, 1982a, 1982b).  General Motors applied this concept in the 1920s and General Electric 
coined the term “residual income” in the 1950s and used it to assess the performance of its 
decentralized divisions (Stern Stewart EVA Roundtable, 1994).   
 More recently, Stern Stewart & Company has advocated that a trademarked variant of 
residual income, Economic Value Added (EVA®), be used instead of earnings or cash from 
operations as a measure of both internal and external performance.2  They argue:  “Abandon 
earnings per share” (Stewart, 1991, p. 2).  “Earnings, earnings per share, and earnings growth are 
misleading measures of corporate performance” (Stewart, 1991, p. 66).  “The best practical 
periodic performance measure is economic value added (EVA)” (Stewart, 1991, p. 66).  “Forget 
EPS, ROE and ROI.  EVA is what drives stock prices” (Stern Stewart advertisement in Harvard 
Business Review, November-December, 1995, p. 20).  Stewart (1994) cites in-house research 
indicating that “EVA stands well out from the crowd as the single best measure of wealth 
                                                 
1  Residual income is generally defined as after-tax operating profits less a charge for invested capital.  Operating 
profits are profits before deducting the after-tax cost of interest expense.  The firm’s weighted average cost of debt 
and equity capital is deducted in the capital charge.  Other labels include: abnormal earnings, Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995); excess earnings, Canning (1929) and Preinreich (1936, 1937, 1938); excess income, Kay (1976), Peasnell 
(1981, 1982); excess realizable profit, Edwards and Bell (1961); and super-profits, Edey (1957).  
2 Stern Stewart & Company is a New York-based consulting firm that markets the “EVA Financial Management 
System” for internal and external performance measurement and incentive compensation.  Performance measures 
marketed by competing firms include cash-flow return on investment (CFROI) by Boston Consulting Group’s 
HOLT Value Associates, discounted cash-flow analysis (DCA) by Alcar, discounted economic profits (EP) by 
Marakon Associates, and economic value management (EVM) by KPMG Peat Marwick.   
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creation on a contemporaneous basis” and “EVA is almost 50% better than its closest 
accounting-based competitor in explaining changes in shareholder wealth” (p. 75). 
 This study provides independent empirical evidence on the information content of EVA, 
residual income, and two mandated performance measures, earnings and cash flow from 
operations.  Our inquiry is motivated by: the claims cited above, interest in EVA in the business 
press, increasing use of EVA by firms, increasing interest in EVA among academics, and 
potential interest in EVA among accounting policy makers.  Citations of EVA in the business 
press have grown exponentially, rising from 1 in 1989 to 294 in 1996 (Lexis/Nexis ‘allnews’ 
library).  Fortune has touted EVA as “The Real Key to Creating Wealth” (September 30, 1993), 
"A New Way to Find Bargains" (December 9, 1996), and has begun augmenting its well-known 
“500” ranking with an annual “Performance 1000” based on data from Stern Stewart (Tully, 
1993, 1994; Fisher, 1995; Lieber, 1996; Teitelbaum, 1997). 
 Companies that have adopted EVA for performance measurement and/or incentive 
compensation include AT&T, Coca Cola, Eli Lilly, Georgia Pacific, Polaroid, Quaker Oats, 
Sprint, Teledyne and Tenneco.  The “EVA Financial Management System” is alleged to 
encourage managers to act more like owners by helping managers make improved operating, 
financing and investment decisions.3  Evidence provided in Wallace (1998) suggests that 
managers compensated on the basis of EVA (instead of earnings) take actions consistent with 
EVA-based incentives. 
                                                 
3  CFO Basil Anderson of Scott Paper states:  “We used to have different financial measures for different purposes -
- discounted cash flow for capital decisions, another measure for rewarding performance and the like.  ...  Now EVA 
is one measure that integrates all that.  ... it offers an excellent link to the creation of shareholder value"  (Walbert, 
1994, p. 111-112).  Jim Meenan, CFO of AT&T’s communications services group expresses a similar view:  “Every 
decision is now based on EVA.  The motivation of our business units is no longer just to make a profit.  The drive is 
to earn the cost of capital.  ... when you drive your business units toward EVA, you're really driving the correlation 
with market value" (Walbert, 1994, p. 112).  Eugene Vesell, managing director of Oppenheimer Capital states:  
“The first thing we look at when we pick companies is, are they motivated by EVA?  We prefer it to measures like 
EPS or return on equity." (Tully, 1994, p. 143)  
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 Recently, academics have shown interest in models of equity valuation that express firm 
value in terms of book value and the expected stream of residual income or “abnormal earnings” 
(Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995).  Our study provides empirical evidence on whether 
current period realizations of residual income (RI) and EVA are more closely associated with 
stock returns than are traditional accounting measures such as earnings and cash from operations 
(CFO). 
 Finally, data on the information content of EVA and RI provide potentially useful input 
to the normative policy debate on what performance measure(s) should be reported in financial 
statements.4  Financial reporting has been criticized for low-quality and lack of relevance in 
today’s information-rich environment.  The AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting 
(1994), the Jenkins Committee, makes suggestions for improving financial reporting that are 
consistent with firms using EVA for internal decision making and external reporting.  A 
prediction from an April 1995 AICPA workshop on the future of financial management is that 
EVA will replace EPS in The Wall Street Journal’s regular stock and earnings reports (Zarowin, 
1995, p. 48).  Widespread interest in revisiting the quality of financial reporting suggests that 
alternatives to currently mandated performance measures should be evaluated for value-
relevance.  This study provides evidence that we hope will be useful to policy-makers who may 
be interested in EVA or RI as replacements (or complements) to earnings and CFO as key 
measures of firm performance. 
 The first (of two) empirical questions we address is: 
Q1: Do EVA and/or RI dominate currently mandated performance measures, 
earnings and operating cash flow, in explaining contemporaneous annual stock 
returns?  
 
                                                 
4  We emphasize that our results are only an input to the policy making process.  Each of the measures we consider 
may have value in other decision contexts, e.g., cash from operations may provide valuable information to lenders 
and suppliers about liquidity.  Questions regarding cost and best source(s) of data are beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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This relative information content question examines which variables (EVA, RI, CFO or 
earnings) have a greater association with contemporaneous stock returns and provides a direct 
test of one of Stern Stewart’s claims about the superiority of EVA.  (In section 5.5 we examine 
separately another Stern Stewart claim that EVA outperforms earnings in explaining firm 
values.)  Using a sample of 6,174 firm-years representing both adopters and non-adopters of 
EVA over the period 1984-1993, tests of question 1 indicate that earnings (R2 = 12.8%) is 
significantly more highly associated with market-adjusted annual returns than are RI (R2 = 7.3%) 
or EVA (R2 = 6.5%) and that all three of these measures dominate CFO (R2 = 2.8%).  This 
finding is supported across a number of alternative specifications. 
 Second, we examine whether EVA and/or RI complement currently mandated 
performance measures, earnings and CFO: 
Q2: Do components unique to EVA and/or RI help explain contemporaneous stock 
returns beyond that explained by CFO and earnings?   
 
This is equivalent to asking: Does the market appear to value a given EVA component beyond 
the information contained in the other components?  To address this incremental information 
content question, we decompose EVA into components (e.g., cash from operations, operating 
accruals, capital charge, and accounting "adjustments") and evaluate the contribution of each 
component toward explaining contemporaneous stock returns.  For the full sample, while each 
component is significantly associated with market-adjusted returns, the EVA components do 
not appear to be economically significant.  Further, tests across alternative specifications 
indicate that, while cash flow and accrual components are consistently significant, components 
unique to EVA (capital charge and accounting adjustments) are typically not significant.  
Considering the relative and incremental information content results together, neither EVA nor 
RI appears to dominate earnings in its association with stock market returns. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a description of 
EVA and its components, presents hypotheses, and describes statistical tests for relative and 
incremental information content.  Section 3 reports sample selection criteria, variable definitions, 
and descriptive statistics.  Section 4 provides empirical results on the relative and incremental 
information content of EVA and its components.  Section 5 reports various extensions and 
sensitivity analyses.  We close with a summary and a discussion of potential factors contributing 
to the failure of EVA and/or RI to dominate earnings. 
 
2. Components of EVA, hypotheses and statistical tests 
2.1 Linkages between operating cash flow, earnings, residual income and EVA 
 This section describes linkages between operating cash flows (CFO), earnings before 
extraordinary items (EBEI), residual income (RI) and economic value added (EVA).  We 
begin by partitioning earnings into operating cash flows and accruals: 
 EBEI = CFO + Accrual,  where: 
 CFO  = net cash provided by operating activities. 
 
 Accrual = total accruals related to operating (as opposed to investing or 
financing) activities, e.g., depreciation, amortization, ∆non-cash 
current assets, ∆current liabilities (other than notes payable and 
current portion of long-term debt), and ∆non-current portion of 
deferred taxes. 
 
 Next, we define net operating profits after tax (NOPAT) as EBEI plus the after-tax cost of 
interest expense: 
 NOPAT = EBEI + ATInt,  where:  
 
 ATInt  = the after-tax equivalent of book interest expense. 
 
NOPAT separates operating activities from financing activities by adding back the after-tax 
effect of debt financing charges (interest expense) included in EBEI. 
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 Residual income differs from EBEI in that it measures operating performance (NOPAT) 
net of a charge for the cost of all debt and equity capital employed: 
 RI = NOPAT - (k * Capital),  where: 
 k      = Stern Stewart’s estimate of the firm’s weighted average cost of capital. 
 
 Capital = Stern Stewart's definition of assets (net of depreciation) invested in going-
concern operating activities, or equivalently, contributed and retained debt 
and equity capital, at the beginning of the period. 
 
Positive RI reflects profits in excess of that required by debt and equity capital suppliers and, 
thus, is consistent with the firm creating wealth for the residual claimants, the shareholders.  
Negative RI is consistent with decreasing shareholder wealth. 
 EVA is Stern Stewart’s proprietary version of RI.  Stern Stewart attempts to improve on RI 
by adjusting NOPAT and Capital for what they view to be “distortions” in the accounting 
model of performance measurement (Stewart, 1991, Chapter 2): 
 EVA = NOPAT + AcctAdjop  -  k * [Capital + AcctAdjc],  where: 
 AcctAdjop = Stern Stewart adjustments to accounting measures of operating profits. 
 
 AcctAdjc = Stern Stewart adjustments to accounting measures of capital. 
 
As an example of a common accounting adjustment, Stewart (1991, pp. 28-30) argues that 
research and development costs should be capitalized (if material) and amortized.  This requires 
adjustments to both NOPAT (via AcctAdjop) and to Capital (via AcctAdjc).  NOPAT is adjusted 
by adding back the period’s R&D expense and deducting amortization of the R&D asset. 5   In 
any given year, the net effect is an increase (decrease) in NOPAT if R&D expense is greater 
(less) than R&D amortization.  AcctAdjc reflect the cumulative effect on Capital of the 
                                                 
5  Other adjustments to NOPAT include: adding the change in bad debt allowances; adding the change in the 
LIFO reserve; adding goodwill amortization; adding other operating income; and subtracting an estimate of 
taxes owed for the period (Stewart 1991, pp. 742-743).  Stern Stewart do not disclose complete details about 
their accounting adjustments, e.g., asset lives and amortization patterns.  
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capitalization and amortization of current and past R&D expenditures.  At any point in time, 
Capital is higher by the amount of the net capitalized R&D asset.6 
 Relying on the above definitions, EVA can be decomposed into its component parts: 
 EVA = CFO + Accrual + ATInt - CapChg + AcctAdj,  where: 
 CapChg = k * Capital 
 
 AcctAdj = AcctAdjop  -  (k * AcctAdjc). 
 
Figure 1 summarizes these relations by showing how EVA components combine into other 
performance measures, i.e., CFO, EBEI, and RI.  We use this decomposition to examine the 
incremental information content of EVA components. 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 By assuming that equity markets are (semi-strong) efficient, forward-looking and can 
form estimates of performance measures, we use stock market returns to compare the information 
content, or value-relevance, of CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA.  Following Biddle, Seow and Siegel 
(1995), we draw a distinction between relative and incremental information content.  Relative 
information content comparisons are appropriate when one desires a ranking of performance 
measures by information content or when making mutually exclusive choices among performance 
measures, i.e., when only one measure can be chosen.  In contrast, incremental information 
content comparisons assess whether one measure provides value-relevant inferences beyond those 
provided by another measure and apply when assessing the information content of a supplemental 
                                                 
6  Other adjustments to capital include: capitalization and amortization of certain marketing costs; subtracting 
marketable securities and construction in progress (because neither contributes to current operating activities); 
adding the present value of non-capitalized long term leases; adding allowances for bad debts, inventory 
obsolescence, warranties, etc.; adding the LIFO reserve; adding net capitalized intangibles (including R&D); 
adding cumulative goodwill amortization; adding unrecorded goodwill; and adding (subtracting) cumulative 
unusual losses (gains), net of taxes (Stewart, 1991, pp. 112-117).  AcctAdjop and AcctAdjc are not examined 
individually in subsequent empirical tests because Stern Stewart does not disclose them separately. 
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disclosure or the information of a component measure (e.g., Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley, 
1987). 
 Despite claims by Stern Stewart and others that EVA and RI are more value-relevant 
to market participants than EBEI and CFO, we take a neutral position and conduct two-tail 
tests of the null hypotheses that CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA have equal relative information 
content: 
 HR:  The information content of measure X1 is equal to that of X2 
where X1 and X2 represent pairwise combinations from the set of performance measures: CFO, 
EBEI, RI and EVA.  Rejection of HR is viewed as evidence of a significant difference in relative 
information content. 
 We examine the incremental value relevance of EVA components summarized in 
figure 1 by testing the null hypotheses that individual components of EVA do not provide 
incremental information content beyond other components that also comprise CFO and EBEI: 
 HI: Component X1 does not provide information content beyond that 
provided by the remaining components X2 through X5 
 
where X1 through X5 are components of EVA (i.e., CFO, Accrual, ATInt, CapChg and 
AcctAdj).  Rejection of HI is viewed as evidence of incremental information content. 
 
2.3  Statistical tests 
 A standard approach for assessing information content is to examine the statistical 
significance of the slope coefficient, b1, in the following ordinary-least-squares regression 
(that omits firm subscripts): 
Dt  =  b0  +  b1 FEXt/MVEt-1  +  et (1) 
 
where: 
 
Dt is the dependent variable, a measure of (abnormal or unexpected) returns 
for time period t, 
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FEXt/MVEt-1 is the unexpected realization (or forecast error) for a given 
accounting measure, X (e.g., CFO, EBEI, RI or EVA), scaled by the 
beginning-of-period market value of the firm’s equity, MVEt-1,
7 
and  
 
et is a random disturbance term.   
 
 Because little is known about suitable proxies for market expectations for performance 
measures other than earnings, we use an approach from Biddle and Seow (1991) and Biddle, 
Seow and Siegel (1995) that estimates market expectations “jointly” with slope coefficients.  
This is accomplished by first expressing the forecast error as the difference between the 
realized value of a performance measure and the market's expectation:  FEt = Xt - E(Xt).  It is 
then assumed that market expectations are formed according to a discrete linear stochastic 
process (in autoregressive form):  
E(X
t
)  =  δ  +  φ
1
 X
t-1
  +  φ
2
 X
t-2
  +  φ
3
 X
t-3
  +  . . . (2) 
 
where the δ is a constant and φ’s are autoregressive parameters.  Substituting equation (2) into 
equation (1) yields: 
D
t
 = b
0
 + b
1
 (X
t
 - (δ + φ
1
 X
t-1
 + φ
 2
 X
t-2
 + φ
 3
 X
t-3
 +  . . . ) ) / MVEt-1 + et. 
 
 = b′
0
 + b′
1
 Xt/MVEt-1 + b′2 Xt-1/MVEt-1 + b′3 Xt-2/MVEt-1 + b′4 Xt-3/MVEt-1 +...+ et.  (3) 
 
Equation (3) relates abnormal returns and (scaled) lagged measures of accounting 
performance, where E(b′0) = b0 - b1δ,  E(b′1) = b1,  and E(b′i) = - bi φ i-1 for i > 1.  In equation 
(3), the proxy for market expectations is estimated jointly with the slope coefficient (b′i) using 
the same data and optimization criterion (minimum mean squared errors). 
 Equation (3) encompasses a range of alternative specifications for market expectations, 
including random-walk, ARIMA, constant stock price multiple, and combined “levels and 
changes” specifications.  Although equation (3) is flexible in terms of allowing any number of 
                                                 
7  The MVE deflator is measured 3 months after the prior year end to be consistent with the start of the returns 
period measured by the dependent variable. 
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lagged observations to be included as explanatory variables, in the presence of possible 
structural change across time, we limit equation (3) to one lag:8 
D
t
  =  b
0
  +  b
1
 X
t
/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  et. (4) 
 
This “one-lag” version is equivalent to the “levels and changes” specification proposed by 
Easton and Harris (1991), but it is motivated differently.  It also is in a more convenient form 
that allows the slope or “response” coefficient (b1) to be observed directly (rather than being 
derived from separate coefficients on levels and changes).9 
2.3.1  Tests for relative information content 
 To assess relative information content, we employ a statistical test from Biddle, Seow 
and Siegel (1995) that allows a test of the null hypothesis of no difference in the ability of two 
competing sets of independent variables to explain variation in the dependent variable.  Using 
this test, we make six pairwise comparisons of regressions among the accounting performance 
measures CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA, as specified in equation (4).  The test is constructed as a 
comparison of R2s.  Under usual regularity conditions (uncorrelated homoskedastic errors), it 
is finite sample exact, generalizes to any number of predictor variables, and can be used in 
conjunction with White’s (1980) correction for heteroskedastic errors.  As a result, it is well 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
8   We also consider a specification that allows each information variable to be predicted by lagged observations 
of all of the information variables.  Thus each information variable, say EVA, is predicted by lagged values of 
each of the other variables -- CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA.  This is one way of addressing the potential concern that 
(say) EVA is less well predicted by past observations of EVA than (say) EBEI is predicted by past values of 
EBEI.  Results based on these specifications are qualitatively similar to those reported and are available from the 
authors. 
9  The relation between the two specifications can be illustrated by starting with the levels-changes specification (in 
4a) and deriving the one-lag specification (in 4c): 
Dt=  a0  +  a1 Xt/MVEt-1  +  a2 (Xt - Xt-1)/MVEt-1  +  et (4a) 
 =  a0  +  a1 Xt/MVEt-1  +  a2 Xt/MVEt-1  -  a2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  et (4b) 
 =  a0  +  (a1 + a2) Xt/MVEt-1  -  a2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  et (4c) 
Equation (4c) corresponds to equation (4) where b1  =  a1 + a2 and b2 =  - a2.  Since a1 and a2 are both expected 
to be positive, b1 (b2) is predicted to be positive (negative).  The coefficient(s) on the non-lag term(s) can be 
interpreted directly as “response” coefficient(s), e.g., in (4c) the response coefficient is (a1 + a2). 
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suited to evaluate the significance of relative information content comparisons in accounting 
contexts.10 
2.3.2  Tests for incremental information content 
 Following standard methodology (e.g., Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley, 1987), 
incremental information content is assessed by examining the statistical significance of 
regression slope coefficients.  Specifically, for the one-lag specification in equation (4) 
generalized to two accounting performance measures X and Y, incremental information 
content is assessed using t-tests on individual coefficients and F-tests of the joint null 
hypotheses: 
 H
0X
:  b
1
 = b
2
 = 0 
 H
0Y
:  b
3
 = b
4
 = 0 
where b
1
, b
2
, b
3
, and b
4
 are from equation (5) below: 
 
D
t
  = b
0
  +  b
1
 X
t
/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  b3 Yt/MVEt-1  +  b4 Yt-1/MVEt-1 + et. (5) 
 
To control for the potential effects of heteroskedastic errors, White’s (1980) correction is 
employed in both the relative and incremental information content tests. 
 
                                                 
10  The Biddle, Seow and Siegel (1995) test derives from Hotelling (1940).  By using a lack-of-fit measure 
defined as the average of the sum of squared residuals and the sum of squared prediction errors, a nonlinear 
null hypothesis is obtained that involves quadratic forms of regression coefficients.  It is tested using a Wald 
test (Kennedy 1985) of estimated coefficients and their heteroskedasticity-adjusted variance-covariance matrix.  
As discussed in Biddle, Seow and Siegel (1995), this method for assessing relative information content 
compares favorably with alternative tests provided in Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) and Vuong (1989).  
Davidson and MacKinnon’s non-nested “J-test” and Vuong’s likelihood ratio test are “pairwise tests for model 
selection” designed to assess which of two competing models is closer (in terms of Kullback-Liebler distance) 
to the “truth.”  Both are valid only asymptotically and may have poor finite sample properties.  The J-test also 
can yield ambiguous results, which is problematic in applications assessing relative information content.  
Dechow, Lys and Sabino (1996) provide evidence that Vuong’s test outperforms the J-test.  Biddle and Siegel 
(1996) provide evidence that the Biddle, Seow and Siegel (1995) test performs as well as or better than 
Vuong’s test in calibration and power.  As confirming evidence, we replicated our relative information content 
tests using Vuong’s test with qualitatively similar results as discussed briefly in section 4 below.  
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3. Sample selection, variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
3.1  Sample selection 
 Data used in this study were purchased directly from Stern Stewart & Co. 11  These data 
include up to eleven annual observations for economic value added (EVA), capital, and cost of 
capital for firms with fiscal years ending June 1983 through May 1994 (see variable definitions 
below).  The initial sample of 1000 firms (8,524 firm-year observations) is reduced by 219 firms 
(2271 observations) due to either missing Compustat or CRSP (Center for Research in Securities 
Prices) data or to provide a lagged observation for each variable.  We also delete 79 extreme 
outlier observations defined as more than 8 standard deviations from the median.  Next, both the 
dependent and independent variables are winsorized to ±4 standard deviations from the median. 
12  The resulting sample has 6,174 firm-year observations for 773 firms. 
 These data are compiled by Stern Stewart & Company from Business Week’s listing of the 
1,000 largest firms in market capitalization.  Stern Stewart modifies this list by first removing 
utilities and financial institutions, and then adding firms from prior Business Week 1000 listings to 
bring the sample back to 1,000 firms.  Stern Stewart introduced its first 1000 ranking for the 
calendar year ended 1988.  The listing has been published annually since. 
3.2  Dependent variable 
 Our dependent variable, market adjusted returns, is commonly used in information content 
studies to measure unexpected returns (e.g., Biddle, Seow and Siegel, 1995; Bowen, Johnson, 
Shevlin and Shores, 1989). 
MktAdjRet  Market adjusted return computed from CRSP data as a firm’s 12 month 
compounded stock return less the 12 month compounded value-weighted market-
wide return.  A 12 month non-overlapping period ending 3 months following the 
                                                 
11  For their publicly available database used in this study, Stern Stewart make “a handful” of standard adjustments.  
For their corporate clients, Stern Stewart make additional custom adjustments (not available to the public).  
12  In other words, data greater (less) than 4 standard deviations from the median of the firm-year observations are 
assigned a value equal to the median plus (minus) 4 standard deviations.  The total number of observations reset for 
any variable range from 51 to 97, or 0.83% to 1.57% of the 6,174 sample firm years.  
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firm’s fiscal year-end is chosen to allow time for information contained in the 
firm’s annual report to be impounded in stock market prices. 
 
3.3  Independent variables and descriptive data -- relative information content tests 
 The four measures of accounting performance in the relative information content tests, 
CFO, EBEI, RI, and EVA, are defined below: 
CFO Cash flow from operations obtained from the statement of cash flows or the 
statement of changes in financial position, depending upon the year of the 
observation.  For years after 1987 Compustat data item D308, operating activities 
- net cash flow, is used.  For years prior to 1988, data item D110, funds from 
operations - total, is used if the firm used the cash definition of funds for the 
statement of changes in financial position.  If the firm used the working capital 
definition of funds in any year prior to 1988, cash flow from operations is 
estimated similar to Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley (1986, 1987) as funds from 
operations (D110) plus the change in current liabilities (D5) less the change in 
debt in current liabilities (D34) less the change in current assets (D4) plus the 
change in cash and cash equivalents (D1).13  
 
EBEI Earnings defined as Compustat data item D18, net income before extraordinary 
items.  
 
RI Residual income equals earnings plus after-tax interest expense less a charge on 
all capital (RI = EBEI + ATInt - CapChg).  See section 3.4 below for definitions 
of ATInt and CapChg.  
 
EVA Economic value added obtained from the Stern Stewart 1000 database.  
 
 In order to reduce heteroscedasticity in the data, we deflate all independent variables by 
the market value of equity three months after the beginning of the fiscal year (MVEt-1).  
Descriptive data on these deflated, winsorized variables pooled across time are provided in panel 
A of table 1. EBEI has the lowest standard deviation among the four performance measures 
consistent with the smoothing effects of accruals.  CFO has the largest firm-year mean and 
median followed by EBEI, EVA and RI.  Undeflated median values of each performance 
measure are plotted across time in figure 2.  Despite a survivorship bias in the data, median RI is 
negative in every year and median EVA is negative in 7 of 10 years.  Near zero EVA and RI is 
consistent with a competitive economy where even the typical large firm has difficulty earning 
                                                 
13  Consistent with the possibility that pre-1988 measures of CFO are noisy, R2s in two-year sub-periods from 
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more than its cost of capital.  Low values of EVA and RI are also consistent with a potential 
upward bias in Stern Stewart’s cost of capital estimates. 
[insert figure 2 about here] 
 Correlations among these measures are provided in panel A of table 1.  Correlations 
between the independent variables are all positive and significant except that EVA and RI are 
negatively correlated with CFO.  EBEI has the highest correlation with market adjusted 
returns. 
[insert table 1 about here] 
 
3.4  Independent variables and descriptive data -- incremental information content tests 
 The independent variables in the incremental information content tests are the five 
components of EVA described in section 2.1 and summarized in figure 1: CFO (defined 
above), operating accruals, after-tax interest expense, capital charge and accounting 
adjustments: 
Accrual Operating accruals defined as earnings less cash flow from operations (Accruals 
= EBEI - CFO).  Accruals can be positive or negative but are more likely to be 
negative (reflecting non-cash expenses such as depreciation and amortization).  
 
ATInt After tax interest expense computed as 1 minus the firm’s tax rate multiplied by 
interest expense (D15).  The firm’s tax rate is assumed to be zero if net operating 
losses are present.  Otherwise the maximum statutory corporate tax rate is used 
for the given year.  ATInt is non-negative.  
 
CapChg Capital charge defined as the firm’s weighted average cost of debt and equity 
capital times its beginning of year capital.14  Both of these items are obtained 
from Stern Stewart.  CapChg is positive since both the cost of capital and capital 
are positive.  
 
AcctAdj Accounting adjustments reflect Stern Stewart’s net annual adjustments to 
earnings and capital, and are defined as economic value added less residual 
income (AcctAdj = EVA - RI).15  AcctAdj can be positive or negative.  
                                                                                                                                                               
1988 onward are slightly higher than for the two, two-year sub-periods before 1988. 
14  According to Stewart (1994), Stern Stewart estimate the cost of capital by weighting the cost of equity 
(applying the capital asset pricing model) and the after-tax cost of debt.  Capital is a proxy for all cash invested 
in the business since a company’s inception.  See Stewart (1991), especially pp. 741-745. 
15  Our definition of RI incorporates Stern Stewart adjustments to Capital.  Data were not available from Stern 
Stewart to calculate capital before accounting adjustments.  
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 Descriptive data on these deflated, winsorized EVA components are provided in panel 
B of table 1.  CFO has by far the largest correlation with market-adjusted returns.  Both mean 
and median Accrual and AcctAdj are negative, consistent with some smoothing of the 
underlying operating cash flows.  Correlations between CFO, ATInt and CapChg are positive 
and significant, consistent with firms with higher operating cash flows also having higher debt 
and equity costs.  The negative correlation between CFO and Accrual is again consistent with 
the accrual process smoothing earnings relative to the underlying operating cash flows.  The 
correlation between CFO and AcctAdj is insignificant. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1  Relative information content tests 
 Relative information content is assessed by comparing adjusted R2s from four separate 
regressions, one for each performance measure, CFO, EBEI, RI, and EVA.16   Adjusted R2s 
from these regressions are provided in table 2.  The highest R2 is shown on the left (which in 
both panels is from the EBEI regression) and the lowest is shown on the far right (which in 
both panels is from the CFO regression).  P-values from two-tailed statistical tests of relative 
information content are shown centered in parentheses for each of the six possible pairwise 
comparisons.   
 Results in panel A of table 2 are based on equation (4) and each of the six pairwise 
differences in R2 are significant at conventional levels, with EBEI having a significantly larger 
adjusted R2 (9%) than each of the other three performance measures.  The RI regression has a 
significantly larger adjusted R2 (6.2%) than does the EVA regression (5.1%), and both have a 
                                                 
16  On average, we predict a positive (negative) slope coefficient on contemporaneous (lagged) observations of 
each performance measure.  The negative coefficient on the lagged term follows from the prediction that 
changes in the performance measures also are positively associated with stock returns (see section 2.3, 
especially footnote 9).  In results available from the authors, coefficient b1 (b2) is positive (negative) and 
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significantly larger adjusted R2s than CFO (2.4%).  These results suggest that, in terms of 
relative information content, earnings significantly outperforms RI, RI significantly 
outperforms EVA (although the gap here is smaller), and all three outperform CFO.17 
[insert table 2 about here] 
 The underlying regressions in panel A constrain the coefficients to be equal across all 
firm-year observations.  Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Collins, et al (1997) 
provide evidence that loss firms have smaller earnings response coefficients than do profitable 
firms.  Because the value-relevance of the other performance measures (CFO, RI and EVA) 
could also vary with their sign (O’Byrne, 1996), we repeat our tests for relative information 
content after partitioning each performance measure into positive and negative values:  
 MktAdjRet
t
 = b0  +  b1 Xt,pos/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt,neg/MVEt-1  +  b3 Xt-1,pos/MVEt-1  + 
  b4 Xt-1,neg/MVEt-1  +  et.   (6) 
 
 Panel B of table 2 presents results for regression (6) for the complete sample of 6,174 
firm-year observations. Consistent with prior research, coefficients (available from the 
authors) are generally larger (in absolute value) and more significant for positive values of Xt 
than for the negative values.  Compared to results reported above in panel A, adjusted R2s 
increase for each performance measure when allowing for separate coefficients on positive 
and negative values.  This increase is largest for the EBEI regression with adjusted R2 
increasing from 9% to 12.8%.  However, the ranking of performance measures remains 
identical and statistical comparisons between regressions are nearly unchanged -- earnings 
dominates each of the other three performance measures and all three (EBEI, RI and EVA) 
                                                                                                                                                               
significant (at <.00001) for each performance measure based on the full sample of 6,174 firm-years.  
17  Nearly identical inferences are obtained using the Vuong (1989) test.  For example, for the relative 
comparisons in panel A of table 2 and table 4, identical inferences are obtained at conventional significance 
levels for all pairwise comparisons.  In general, the Vuong test provides greater statistical significance, 
consistent with its asymptotic nature and tendency to reject the null observed in simulation tests (Biddle and 
Siegel, 1996). 
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dominate CFO.  The only difference is that RI and EVA are no longer statistically different 
from each other. 
 Taken as a whole, the relative information content results show no evidence of EVA (RI 
or CFO) dominating EBEI.  Thus, we cannot support the Stern Stewart claim that EVA has 
greater information content than earnings.  In contrast, this evidence points to earnings having 
higher relative information content than EVA.  In section 5, we examine the sensitivity of 
these results to alternative specifications.  In section 6, we discuss possible reasons why we 
fail to detect stronger value-relevance for EVA and RI. 
 
4.2  Incremental information content tests 
 Table 3 presents results on the incremental information content of EVA components 
from regression (7): 
 MktAdjRet
t
  = b
0
  +  b
1
 CFO
t
  +  b
2
 CFO
t-1
  + b
3
 Accrual
t
  +  b
4
 Accrual
t-1
  +  
  b
5
 ATInt
t
  +  b
6
 ATInt
t-1
  +  b
7
 CapChg
t
  +  b
8
 CapChg
t-1
  +   
  b
9
 AcctAdj
t
  +  b
10
 AcctAdj
t-1
  +  e
t
. (7) 
 
Predicted signs on each coefficient are provided below the variable labels.  We expect a positive 
association between market-adjusted returns and the three components CFO, Accrual and 
AcctAdj.  We expect a negative association between returns and the two components 
representing non-negative capital costs, ATInt and CapChg.  Similar to the relative information 
content regressions in (4), the lagged terms are predicted to have the opposite sign (footnote 9). 
[insert table 3 about here] 
 In panel A for the full sample, 9 of 10 coefficients are in the predicted direction and 
significant in one-tail t-tests at the 0.05 level or better.  The exception is the lagged term for 
AcctAdj, which is in the wrong direction.  All of the two-tail F-tests are significant at the 0.05 
level or better.  The relative sizes of the F-statistics suggest that CFO and Accrual make by far 
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=2
94
8
Does EVA® beat earnings? page 18 
 
the largest incremental contributions to explaining market-adjusted returns, while ATInt, 
CapChg and AcctAdj exhibit much smaller incremental contributions.  When combined with the 
relative information content findings above, these results suggest that, while EVA components 
offer some incremental information content beyond earnings components, their contributions to 
the information content of EVA are not sufficient for EVA to provide greater relative 
information content than earnings. 
 Figure 3 uses a Venn diagram to summarize our findings on relative and incremental 
information content for the four information variables CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA.  The size of each 
circle represents relative information content and the non-overlapping areas represent incremental 
information content.  EBEI exhibits the largest relative information content among the measures.  
CFO, RI and EVA protrude slightly from behind EBEI reflecting some limited incremental 
information content beyond earnings.  However, the overall minuscule increase in adjusted R2 
between the regression of returns on EBEI (9.04% in panel A of table 2) and returns on EVA 
components (9.07% in table 3) suggests that the economic significance of the incremental 
information content of the EVA components is slight.   
[insert figure 3 about here] 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses and extensions 
 In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the basic results reported above to alternative 
specifications.  We repeat selected information content tests by: 1) partitioning annual 
observations into five, non-overlapping, 2-year test periods (instead of one ten-year period); 2) 
evaluating subsets of firms that claim to use EVA for internal business decisions; 3) changing the 
return interval from one-year to five-years; and 4) changing the return interval from one-year 
(contemporaneous) returns to two-year (combined contemporaneous and one-year ahead) returns.  
Finally, we discuss a replication and extension of O’Byrne (1996), where the dependent variable 
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is the level of market value of the firm (rather than returns).   We conclude with an overall 
assessment of the results of the sensitivity tests. 
 
5.1  Partitioning the sample into sub-periods 
 Results reported in tables 2 and 3 pool observations over the ten years 1984-1993.  In this 
section, we report relative and incremental information content tests on annual data grouped into 
five, non-overlapping, two-year periods.  Because of survivorship bias in the Stern Stewart data, 
firm-year observations increase from 1,015 in the 1984-85 period to 1,481 in 1992-93.   
 In pairwise comparisons of relative information content, adjusted R2s are largest for 
EBEI in every two-year period.  However, in 1984-85 differences between EBEI, EVA and RI 
are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Using a 5% cutoff, in 1986-87, EBEI does 
not outperform RI (p = 0.072) but does outperform EVA (p = 0.045).  In 1988-89 and 1990-91, 
EBEI outperforms each of the other performance measures at the 0.01 level or better.  In 1992-
93, EBEI does not outperform RI (p = 0.083) but does outperform EVA (p = 0.006).  Taken 
together, there is no evidence of EVA (RI or CFO) dominating EBEI.  Thus we again cannot 
support the Stern Stewart claim that EVA has greater information content than earnings.  In 
contrast, the evidence points to earnings having higher relative information content in many sub-
periods. 
 We also consider the 606 observations following the September 1993 Fortune article that 
touted EVA as “The Real Key to Creating Wealth” (Tully, 1993).  The earnings regression again 
has the highest R2 (11.2%), and the evidence is suggestive of EBEI dominating EVA (p = 0.049) 
and CFO (p = 0.061) but not RI.  EVA apparently did not catch on with market participants in 
the period immediately following the Fortune article. 
 In incremental information content tests, CFO and Accrual are significant in every two-
year period.  Among the remaining EVA components (ATInt, CapChg and AcctAdj), only 1 of 
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15 F-statistics is significant at the 5% level – AcctAdj in the 1984-85 sample period.  Results for 
the period after release of the 1993 Fortune article again show strong support for the incremental 
information content of CFO and Accrual, but little evidence for the incremental significance of 
the remaining EVA components.   
5.2  Adopters of ‘EVA-like’ performance measures 
 It is possible that firms adopt EVA at least in part because their past experience indicates 
a relatively strong relation between EVA and stock returns.  Further, investors may become more 
attuned to the measure for firms that adopt EVA.  Thus, it is conceivable that the association 
between EVA and returns is stronger for EVA adopters.  To examine this possibility, we 
consider separately four sub-samples of firms that make some “use” of EVA-like measures.  
Firms in the “Any” sample have disclosed that they use EVA (or some similar concept) 
sometime during the period studied – even if that use appears to be minimal.  Firms in the 
“Performance” sample provide more detail about their use of an EVA-like measure for 
performance measurement and/or decision making.  Firms in the “Comp” sample state that they 
use an EVA-like measure in senior management incentive compensation plans and thus, 
presumably, also use it for performance measurement and/or decision making.  We include all 
available data including years before the plan was implemented.  The “Comp Year” sample 
restricts observations in the “Comp” sample to only those years in which an EVA-based 
compensation plan is in effect.  Thus, the “Comp Year” sample is a subset of the “Comp” 
sample, which is a subset of the “Performance” sample, which, in turn, is a subset of the “Any” 
sample. 
 Table 4 reports the results of relative information content tests for firms using an EVA-
like performance measure.  EBEI exhibits the largest R2s for the “Any,” "Performance" and 
“Comp” groups, but EVA has the largest R2 for the "Comp Year" sample.  However, none of the 
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performance measures differ significantly in relative information content at the 5% level, and 
only 3 of 18 comparisons at the 10% level (EBEI > CFO for the “Any” sub-sample (p = 0.073); 
EBEI > RI for the “Any” and "Performance" sub-samples (p = 0.094 and 0.059, respectively)).  
While earnings is not as dominant in these smaller sub-samples of EVA users, neither do the 
findings show EVA dominating earnings in its association with stock returns.  The lower 
significance levels may be attributable in part to the smaller sample sizes used in these tests. 
[insert table 4 about here] 
 Table 5 reports tests of incremental information content for users of EVA-like 
performance measures.  In one-tail t-tests of individual slope coefficients using a 5% cutoff (t = 
1.65), 13 of 16 are significant for the CFO and Accrual components while only 1 of 24 are 
individually significant for the remaining EVA components.  With the exception of the “Comp 
Year” group, none of the two-tail F-tests are significant for components unique to EVA.  In the 
small “Comp Year” sample (n = 35), both CapChg and AcctAdj have significant F-statistics 
suggesting they make an incremental contribution to explaining contemporaneous security 
returns in years where firms have EVA-based compensation plans in effect.  However, caution is 
warranted in drawing any inferences from this result due to: the small size of the “Comp Year” 
sample, the surprising insignificant F-statistics on CFO and Accrual, and the unexpected signs 
on coefficients on CapChg.  Again, other than weakly suggestive results for the “Comp Year” 
sample, it does not appear users of EVA are adopting the concept because of its stronger 
association with stock returns. 
[insert table 5 about here] 
5.3  Five-year returns as the dependent variable 
 In this section we extend the return interval from one year to five years.  Stern Stewart 
reports its strongest results for EVA on five-year data (Stewart, 1991, 1994).  In addition, 
because five-year data are less sensitive to the choice of expectations models, these tests help 
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address the possibility that the weaker performance of EVA is due to a poorer expectations 
model.  Regression (8) below is used to evaluate relative information content comparisons.  It 
includes non-lagged and lagged terms similar to the annual return regression (4) and are 
analogous to the “level and changes” specification discussed in section 2.3 and footnote 9.  
Independent variables reflect “five-year sums” in that each performance measure, Xt, is 
summed over the most recent five year period 1989-93 (for the non-lagged term) and summed 
over the prior five years, 1984-88 (for the lagged term). 
 “5-year sums:” MktAdjRett  =  b0  +  b1 ∑Xt/MVEt-5  +  b2 ∑Xt-5/MVEt-5  +  et. (8) 
Since all 10 years of data are used to examine the association between five-year returns and 
each performance measure, only one test period is reported in table 6.  Results again show the 
earnings regression with the highest R2 (31.2%) followed by CFO (18.9%), EVA (14.5%) and 
RI (10.9%).  The differences in explanatory power between EBEI and each of the other three 
performance measures are highly significant. 
[insert table 6 about here] 
 In table 7 we report incremental information content of EVA components after extending 
the return interval from one year to five years.  CFO and Accrual are again highly significant but 
the results on components unique to EVA (CapChg and AcctAdj) are insignificant.18   
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
5.4  Two-year (contemporaneous and one-year ahead) returns as the dependent variable 
 To consider the possibility that equity market participants take longer to learn about and 
impound EVA, we extend the return interval from the one-year contemporaneous period used 
                                                 
18  We also evaluated the relative and incremental information content using changes in (rather than sums of) each 
performance measure over the five-year period.  In relative information content tests, once again EBEI 
outperformed EVA.  In incremental information content tests, only AcctAdj for the 1988-93 sub-period was 
significant at the 5% level while none of the other components unique to EVA were significant in the predicted 
direction. 
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above to a two-year period that includes both the contemporaneous and subsequent year.  
Consistent with results in table 2, and inconsistent with the conjecture that the market 
subsequently learns about the importance of EVA, EBEI has significantly higher association with 
two-year returns (adjusted R2 = 4.4%) than does any of the other three information variables 
(whose R2s range from 2% to 2.3%). 
 
5.5 Market value of the firm as the dependent variable  
 Another claim made by Stern Stewart is EVA’s higher association with the market value of 
the firm.19  To test this claim, we replicate and extend a study authored by Stern Stewart vice-
president Stephen O’Byrne (1996).  There are three main differences between O’Byrne’s 
research and our tests reported above.  First, O’Byrne uses market value of the firm (debt plus 
equity) as the dependent variable while we use market-adjusted returns.  Second, he draws 
inferences by comparing the magnitudes of R2s, while we draw inferences by relying on formal 
statistical tests of relative information content.  Third, and in our view most important, O’Byrne 
makes a series of ‘adjustments’ only to the EVA regressions and uses R2s from these adjusted 
regressions to infer superiority of EVA over competing information variables. 
 The initial relations tested in O’Byrne (before ‘adjustments’) are:20 
 MVt/capitalt-1 = ß0  +  ß1 (EVAt/k)/capitalt-1 +  et (9) 
 
 MVt/capitalt-1 = ß0  +  ß1 (NOPATt)/capitalt-1 +  et (10) 
 
where: 
MVt/capitalt-1  the market value of debt plus equity deflated by beginning of period capital.  
EVAt  economic value added for year t, i.e., NOPATt  -  k(capitalt-1) 
NOPATt  net operating profits after tax for year t.  
k  Stern Stewart’s estimate of the firm’s weighted average cost of capital.  
                                                                                                                                                               
 
19  We also examined the change in “market value added” (defined by Stern Stewart as firm market value less 
invested capital) as a dependent variable with qualitatively similar findings. 
20  O’Byrne scales EVA by k and capital and NOPAT only by capital.  We cannot replicate results for free cash 
flow because O’Byrne (1996) does not provide a precise definition. 
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capitalt-1  Stern Stewart's definition of assets (net of depreciation) invested in going-
concern operating activities, or equivalently, contributed and retained debt 
and equity capital, at the beginning of period t.  
et  unexplained residual error.  
O'Byrne compares R2s from the initial two models and reports 31% for the EVA model (9) and 
33% for the NOPAT model (10).  Next, he makes a series of adjustments to the EVA regressions 
by: 1) allowing separate coefficients for positive and negative values of EVA, 2) including the 
natural log of capital in an attempt to capture differences in the way the market values firms of 
different sizes, and 3) including 57 industry dummy variables in order to capture potential 
industry effects.  None of these adjustments are made for the NOPAT regression, and O’Byrne 
further argues that a pure NOPAT model should be forced through the origin (p. 120).21  After 
these adjustments, he reports a much higher R2 for the final model containing EVA (56%) than 
for the final model containing NOPAT (which, because of the intercept restriction, falls to 
17%).22  O’Byrne (1996, p. 125) concludes: 
 
“EVA, unlike NOPAT or other earnings measures like net income or earnings per share, is 
systematically linked to market value.  It should provide a better predictor of market value 
than other measures of operating performance.  And, as we have shown, it does provide a 
better predictor once we understand and adjust for two critical relationships between EVA 
and market value.” 
 
 Given the success of earnings in our returns tests discussed above, we add EBEI to the 
consideration set and replicate O’Byrne’s final model using 5,843 firm-year observations 
obtained from Stern Stewart as described earlier.  In table 8, we treat EVA, NOPAT and EBEI as 
competing performance measures and apply O’Byrne’s three adjustments to each variable (as 
described in regression equation (11) in a note to the table).  With this ‘level playing field,’ 
EVA’s superiority disappears.  With all of O’Byrne’s adjustments (including industry dummies), 
the EBEI regression has a significantly higher association with firm value (adjusted R2 = 53%) 
than the EVA regression (50%).23  After making the same adjustments to the NOPAT regression, 
                                                 
21  O’Byrne argues that a non-zero intercept makes predicted MV a function of capital and therefore an EVA 
model in disguise.  If so, it would follow from our findings that current realizations of EBEI are a better proxy 
for future EVA than are current realizations of EVA. 
22  O’Byrne reports adjusted R2 of 42% for the EVA model omitting industry intercept dummies. 
23  Omitting scaling by the cost of capital (k) from regression equation (11) yields R2s of 53% for EBEI, 51% for 
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the R2 of 49% is not significantly different from the EVA regression.  Thus, similar to results 
reported for our returns tests above, results in table 8 provide no evidence of the EVA regression 
outperforming earnings in explaining deflated firm values.24 
[insert table 8 about here] 
5.6  Overall assessment of the sensitivity tests 
 Considering jointly the sensitivity analyses of relative information content discussed in 
sections 5.1 through 5.5, we still find no evidence to support the Stern Stewart claim that EVA 
(or RI) outperform EBEI.  In only one case (the “Comp Year” group in table 4) does EVA 
and/or RI have a higher R2 than EBEI and this difference is not statistically significant.  In 
contrast, adjusted R2 is highest for EBEI in the remaining comparisons and EBEI significantly 
outperforms EVA in several sensitivity tests at the 5% level.   
 In terms of incremental information content, the analyses in section 5 provide only 
limited evidence that components unique to EVA (i.e., CapChg and AcctAdj) add to the 
information set that includes earnings (i.e., CFO and accruals), e.g., only 2 of the F-statistics 
and none of the t-statistics on CapChg and AcctAdj are significant at the 5% level.  Thus, from 
the sensitivity tests in section 5, we find no evidence that EVA dominates earnings in its 
association with stock returns or firm values. 
                                                                                                                                                               
EVA and 51% for NOPAT.  Omitting industry dummies from equation (11) (while retaining scaling by k) yields 
R2s of 47% for EBEI, 43% for EVA and 41% for NOPAT. 
24  These results are not directly comparable with the returns results above since they employ different functional 
forms and additional variables due to O'Byrne (1996). 
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6. Summary and potential limitations 
 Motivated by increased use in practice and increased interest in the media and among 
academics, we examine the value-relevance of EVA and residual income compared to 
currently-mandated performance measures – earnings and cash flow from operations.  There is 
little evidence to support the Stern Stewart claim that EVA is superior to earnings in its 
association with stock returns or firm values.  In no case does EVA significantly outperform 
EBEI in tests of relative information content.  On the contrary, in most cases the evidence 
suggests that earnings outperforms EVA.  Further, while the charge for capital and Stern 
Stewart’s adjustments for accounting “distortions” show some marginal evidence of being 
incrementally important, this difference does not appear to be economically significant.  
Possible reasons why we do not detect stronger value-relevance for EVA include: 
• Our research design uses current realizations, not future flows, of each performance 
measure.  Equity valuation is ultimately the discounted present value of future equity cash 
flows (or dividends or RI or EVA).  Even if EVA is a good proxy for economic profits, 
realized EVA may not outperform the current realizations of other performance measures 
such as earnings in proxying for future equity cash flows.  This is similar to the rationale 
we often hear for why EBEI generally outperforms CFO (arguably the more primitive 
measure) in relative information content. 
 
• Stern Stewart’s estimates of the charge for capital and accounting adjustments may contain 
measurement error relative to what the market is using to value firms.  Further, we use 
Stern Stewart’s publicly available database which does not include many custom 
adjustments they use for their clients. 
 
• There exists little or no “surprise value” in components unique to EVA including the 
capital charge and Stern Stewart’s accounting adjustments.  For example, if the cost of 
capital and the amount of capital are slow to change (or the changes are predictable months 
or years in advance), the market should long ago have impounded these data.  However, 
over five-year return intervals, the opportunity for surprise should be larger, and results 
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reported in section 5.3 do not lend support for the superiority of EVA over this longer 
return interval. 
 
• Data needed to compute EVA are not easily estimated and the market does not have these 
data during our test period.  Recall that we assume that the market has access to sufficient 
data within 3 months of a firm’s fiscal year end such that EVA (and its components) can be 
reliably estimated by that time.  This potential issue is mitigated in tests that use alternative 
dependent variables (i.e., five-year return intervals in section 5.3, two-year return intervals 
that include both contemporaneous and one-year ahead returns in section 5.4, and firm 
values in section 5.5).  Again the evidence does not support the superiority of EVA. 
 
• In attempting to approximate economic profits, adjustments made by Stern Stewart may 
remove accruals that market participants use to infer firms’ future prospects.  These could 
be discretionary accruals that managers use to “signal” future prospects or nondiscretionary 
accruals that are by-products of the accounting process.25  Thus, in constructing EVA, it is 
possible that Stern Stewart obtains a measure that is closer in level to economic profits 
(than say EBEI), but at the same time reduces its association with stock returns. 
 
• In violation of our maintained hypothesis of semi-strong market efficiency, the market may 
have failed to recognize the reporting benefits of EVA through the period we study, 
consistent with the notion of ‘earnings myopia.’26  As more data become available, future 
studies will be able to assess whether market participants have come to appreciate EVA.  It 
also is possible to imagine a new equilibrium in which firms would disclose EVA rather 
than earnings.  However, this would subject EVA to many of the same legal and regulatory 
influences, and as a consequence, the resulting metric might closely resemble earnings (or 
what earnings might become).  For this reason, and despite its alleged advantages for 
internal decision making, we do not anticipate that EVA will displace earnings for financial 
reporting purposes. 
 
                                                 
25 Collins and DeAngelo (1990), Subramanyam (1996), and Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin (1997) report evidence 
consistent with discretionary accruals increasing the informativeness of earnings.  Wu (1997) presents an 
agency model in which firms will optimally choose accounting adjustments for internal performance metrics 
that serve to reduce their correlation with stock returns. 
26 Wallace (1996, 1997) reports that some adopters of EVA feel they must still base their external performance 
on earnings because this is the measure on which financial analysts continue to focus. 
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 Until further research can be conducted, our conclusion is that, although for some firms 
EVA may be an effective tool for internal decision making, performance measurement and 
incentive compensation, it does not dominate earnings in its association with stock market 
returns for the sample firms and period studied.  To the contrary, and in contrast to claims by 
Stern Stewart, our evidence suggests that earnings generally dominates EVA in value-relevance 
to market participants. 
 An avenue for future research suggested by the findings of this study is to examine 
more closely which components of EVA and earnings contribute to, or subtract from, 
information content.  For example, ex ante, capitalizing R&D and marketing costs should only 
add to EVA’s information content given both are generally expensed in the determination of 
earnings.  In contrast, by estimating taxes paid in cash (rather than tax expense), EVA may lose 
information content by removing value-relevant deferred tax accruals.  Research at this level of 
detail requires data that are currently unavailable from Stern Stewart on individual adjustments 
used in the calculation of EVA.    
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Figure 1 
Components of Economic Value Added (EVA)
EVA = CFO  +  Accrual  +  ATInt  -  CapChg  +  AcctAdj
earnings (EBEI)
operating profits (NOPAT)
residual income (RI)
economic value added (EVA)  
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Figure 2
Median values of performance measures, 1984-93
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Figure 3 
Relative and incremental information content of EVA®, residual income, earnings 
and operating cash flow 
 
EVA®
Earnings
Cash from operations
Residual income  
 
This figure depicts a combination of relative information content comparisons (R2s) shown as circle sizes and 
incremental information content comparisons (F-statistics) shown as relative positioning or lack of overlap (with less 
overlap indicating more incremental information content).  Adjusted R2s for relative comparisons (from panel A of 
table 2) are:  EBEI = 9% > RI = 6.2% > EVA = 5.1% > CFO = 2.4%.   
 
The incremental comparisons shown in the figure are based on a regression of MktAdjRet on CFO, EBEI, EVA and RI 
rather than on their components as in table 2.  Incremental F-statistics indicating areas not overlapping with any of the 
other circles are:  EBEI = 24.66, CFO = 11.55, EVA = 9.81 and RI = 2.31. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for pooled data 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables in relative information content testsa 
 
Descriptive statistics: 
    Dependent Variable                 Independent Variables  
  MktAdjRett  EBEIt EVAt RIt CFOt 
 Mean .059  .057 -.049 -.056 .142 
 Median .011  .065 -.007 -.017 .118 
 Std. Dev. .362  .082 .134 .127 .133 
 
Correlationsb 
  MktAdjRett  EBEIt EVAt RIt CFOt 
 MktAdjRett 1.00      
 EBEIt .247  1.00    
 EVAt .153  .592 1.00   
 RIt .155  .652 .900 1.00  
 CFOt .138  .307 -.125 -.122 1.00 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables in incremental information 
content testsa 
 
Descriptive statistics: 
    Dependent Variable                              Independent Variables  
  MktAdjRett  CFOt Accrualt ATIntt CapChgt AcctAdjt 
 Mean .059  .142 -.086 .034 .149 -.007 
 Median .011  .118 -.055 .016 .111 -.007 
 Std. Dev. .362  .133 .137 .054 .129 .055 
 
Correlationsb 
  MktAdjRett  CFOt Accrualt ATIntt CapChgt AcctAdjt 
 MktAdjRett 1.00  
 CFOt .138  1.00 
 Accrualt .021  -.782 1.00 
 ATIntt -.026  .363 -.501 1.00 
 CapChgt -.018  .469 -.580 .751 1.00 
 AcctAdjt -.011  .004 .039 .210 .057 1.00 
______________ 
a The sample has 6,174 firm-year observations.  All variables are winsorized ±4 standard deviations from the 
median.  All independent variables are deflated by the market value of equity three months after the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
 
b Pearson correlation coefficients > .0204 are significant at < .10 
 > .0319 are significant at < .01 
 > .0407 are significant at < .001 
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Table 2 
Tests of the relative information content of 
EVA®, residual income, earnings and operating cash flow (HR) 
 
Panel A: coefficient on positive and negative values of each performance measure constrained to be equala 
 
  Observations  Relative Information Content   
 
Rank order of R2  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 All Firms 6,174 EBEI > RI > EVA > CFO 
 Adj. R2 .0904 .0624 .0507 .0238 
 p-valueb (.000) (.041) (.001) 
 (.000) (.000) 
 (.000) 
 
 
Panel B: coefficient on positive and negative values of each performance measure allowed to differc 
 
  Observations  Relative Information Content   
 
Rank order of R2  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 All Firms 6,174 EBEI > RI > EVA > CFO 
 Adj. R2 .1278 .0732 .0649 .0280 
 p-valueb (.000) (.266) (.000) 
 (.000) (.000) 
 (.000) 
 
 
a Underlying regressions are from equation (4): Dt  =  b0  +  b1 Xt/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  et  where Dt  = 
market-adjusted returns; X = a given performance measure (CFO, EBEI, RI and EVA); and MVE = the market value of 
equity three months after the beginning of the fiscal year.  Performance metrics are listed in order of R-squares from 
highest (on the left) to lowest (on the right).  Statistical tests of differences in explanatory power across performance 
measures are presented centered in parentheses below the adjusted R-squares.  See description of p-values below. 
 
b Two-tailed p-values in parentheses represent tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between pairwise 
comparisons of adjusted R-squares (Biddle, Seow and Siegel 1995).  First row presents p-values for comparison 
between first and second ranked measures, second and third ranked measures and third and fourth ranked measures.  On 
the next row, comparisons are between first and third ranked, and second and fourth ranked measures.  The last row 
compares first and fourth ranked measures. 
 
c Underlying regressions are from equation (4) modified to allow different coefficients on positive versus negative 
values of the independent variables:  
Dt  =  b0  +  b1 Xt,pos/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt, neg/MVEt-1  +  b3 Xt-1,pos/MVEt-1  + b4 Xt-1,neg/MVEt-1  +  et  (6) 
where Dt  = market-adjusted returns; X = a given performance measure (CFO, EBEI, RI or EVA); and MVE = market 
value of equity three months after the beginning of the fiscal year. 
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Table 3 
 
Tests of incremental information content of EVA® components: 
CFO, operating accruals, after-tax interest, capital charge, accounting adjustments (HI)a 
 
  Obs. Constant CFOt CFOt-1 Accrualt Accrualt-1 ATIntt ATIntt-1 CapChgt CapChgt-1 AcctAdjt AcctAdjt-1 Adj. R2 
Predicted signs:   + - + - - + - + + - 
 
 All Firms 6,174 .013 1.473 -.824 1.192 -.751 -.594 .772 -.391 .270 .357 .055 .0907 
 t-stat  1.42 16.02 -8.53 13.09 -7.73 -2.21 2.63 -2.43 1.72 3.12 0.48 
 F-stat 128.42 87.83 3.45 3.61 6.55 
 p-valueb (.000) (.000) (.032) (.027) (.001) 
 
 
 
a Dependent variable = market-adjusted returns; independent variables are components of EVA (CFO, operating accruals, after-tax interest expense, capital 
charge, accounting adjustments) and are shown in non-lagged and lagged forms as column headings.  Each independent variable is deflated by market value of 
equity 3 months after the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
b P-values in parentheses represent non-directional F-tests of the null hypothesis of no incremental information content (hypothesis HI). 
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Table 4 
Tests of relative information content (HR): Sample partitioned by relative “use” of EVA
®a 
 
  Observations  Relative Information Contentb  
 
Rank order of Rc  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 "Any" 626 EBEI > RI > EVA > CFO 
 Adj. R2 .0799 .0523 .0484 .0317 
 p-valuec (.094) (.867) (.550) 
 (.278) (.486) 
 (.073) 
 
 "Performance" 445 EBEI > EVA > CFO > RI 
 Adj. R2 .0461 .0386 .0262 .0239 
 p-value (.765) (.699) (.938) 
 (.481) (.491) 
 (.059) 
 
 "Comp" 344 EBEI > CFO > EVA > RI 
 Adj. R2 .0306 .0292 .0220 .0181 
 p-value (.962) (.834) (.855) 
 (.735) (.737)  
 (.412) 
 
 "Comp Year" 35 EVA > RI > EBEI > CFO 
 Adj. R2 .3072 .2644 .2366 .1152 
 p-value (.352) (.667) (.393) 
 (.481) (.330)  
 (.211) 
 
a Firms are categorized in their use of EVA as follows: 
• “Any” represents all firms that have mentioned that they use EVA for performance evaluation and/or 
explicit incentive compensation – even if that use appears minimal. 
• “Performance” represents those firms that have mentioned that they use EVA for performance 
measurement but do not disclose any use of EVA in their explicit incentive compensation plans. 
• “Comp” represents those firms that use EVA in their explicit incentive compensation plans and, 
presumably therefore, for performance measurement.  Given the existence of a plan in any year, all 
available firm-years are included. 
• “Comp Year” represents a subset of observations from “Comp” only including years where firms 
have an EVA-based compensation plan in place. 
“Comp Year” is a subset of “Comp”; “Comp” is a subset of “Performance”; and “Performance” is a subset of “Any.”  
b Underlying regressions are from equation (4): Dt  =  b0  +  b1 Xt/MVEt-1  +  b2 Xt-1/MVEt-1  +  et  where Dt  = 
market-adjusted returns; X = a given performance measure (EVA, RI, EBEI, CFO); and MVE = the market value of 
equity three months after the beginning of the fiscal year.  Performance metrics are listed in order of R-squares from 
underlying regression equation (4), from highest (on the left) to lowest (on the right).  Statistical tests of differences in 
explanatory power across performance measures are presented centered in parentheses below the adjusted R-squares.  
See description of p-values below. 
c Two-tailed p-values in parentheses represent tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between pairwise 
comparisons of adjusted R-squares (Biddle, Seow and Siegel 1995).  First row presents p-values for comparison 
between first and second ranked measures, second and third ranked measures and third and fourth ranked measures.  On 
the next row, comparisons are between first and third ranked, and second and fourth ranked measures.  The last row 
compares first and fourth ranked measures. 
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Table 5 
Tests of incremental information content of EVA® components (HI): Sample partitioned by relative “use” of EVAa,b 
 
  Obs. Constant CFOt CFOt-1 Accrualt Accrualt-1 ATIntt ATIntt-1 CapChgt CapChgt-1 AcctAdjt AcctAdjt-1 Adj. R2 
Predicted signs:   + - + - - + - + + - 
 
 "Any" 626 -.012 1.138 -.624 .843 -.896 -1.105 1.434 -.123 -.215 .324 -.126 .1054 
 t-stat  -0.45 5.30 -2.61 4.04 -3.41 -1.35 1.69 -0.58 -1.05 0.95 -0.43 
 F-stat 14.09 10.40 1.45 2.01 0.46 
 p-valuec (.000) (.000) (.235) (.136) (.634) 
 
 "Performance" 445 -.044 1.047 -.396 .835 -.919 -1.036 .791 -.129 -.087 .488 -.494 .0780 
 t-stat  -1.52 4.08 -1.55 3.53 -3.07 -1.08 0.76 -0.60 -0.41 1.35 -1.54 
 F-stat 8.64 7.17 0.59 0.62 1.54 
 p-value (.000) (.001) (.557) (.539) (.216) 
 
 "Comp" 344 -.055 .868 -.365 .709 -.958 -1.023 .376 .344 -.368 .425 -.562 .0625 
 t-stat  -1.70 3.05 -1.23 2.60 -2.61 -1.00 0.37 0.62 -0.71 1.09 -1.51 
 F-stat 4.72 4.70 0.61 0.25 1.34 
 p-value (.009) (.010) (.544) (.779) (.265) 
 
 "Comp Year" 35 -.015 .308 -1.769 .759 -2.178 -1.687 -1.240 3.130 -.841 -2.122 -4.167 .3344 
 t-stat  -1.70 3.05 -1.23 2.60 -2.61 -1.00 0.37 0.62 -0.71 1.09 -1.51 
 F-stat 0.87 2.02 1.26 4.04 3.66 
 p-value (.430) (.154) (.303) (.031) (.041) 
 
 
a Firms are categorized in their use of EVA as follows: 
 “Any” represents all firms that have made any mention of using EVA for performance evaluation and/or explicit incentive compensation – even if that 
use appears minimal. 
 “Performance” represents those firms that have mentioned that they use EVA for performance measurement but do not disclose any use of EVA in their 
explicit incentive compensation plans. 
 “Comp” includes all firm-year observations for those firms that use EVA in their explicit incentive compensation plans in any year. 
 “Comp Year” includes a subset of observations from “Comp” for only those years where the EVA-based compensation plan is in effect. 
 “Comp Year” is a subset of “Comp”; “Comp” is a subset of “Performance”; and “Performance” is a subset of “Any.”  
 
b Dependent variable = market-adjusted returns; independent variables are components of EVA (CFO, operating accruals, after-tax interest expense, capital 
charge, accounting adjustments) and are shown in non-lagged and lagged forms as column headings. 
 
c P-values in parentheses represent non-directional F-tests of the null hypothesis of no incremental information content (hypothesis HI). 
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Table 6 
Tests of relative information content (HR): Returns measured over 5-year periodsa 
 
 
 
  Observations  Relative Information Content  
 
Rank order of R2  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 "5-Year Sums" 509 EBEI > CFO > EVA > RI 
 Adj. R2 .3118 .1888 .1446 .1090 
 p-valueb (.005) (.264) (.030) 
 (.000) (.051)  
 (.000) 
 
 
 
a Underlying regression is from equation (8): 
 
“5-year sums:”  Dt  =  b0  +  b1 ∑Xt/MVEt-5  +  b2 ∑Xt-5/MVEt-5  +  et ,  
 
where ∑ is defined over the 5-year intervals, 1989-93 (non-lag) and 1984-88 (lagged) terms, respectively; 
Dt  = market-adjusted returns measured over 5 years; X = a given performance measure (CFO, EBEI, RI, or EVA); and 
MVE = market value of equity three months after the beginning of the  fiscal year. 
 
b P-values in parentheses represent two-tail tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between pairwise 
comparisons of adjusted R-squares (Biddle, Seow and Siegel 1995).  First row presents p-values for comparison 
between first and second ranked measures, second and third ranked measures and third and fourth ranked measures.  On 
the next row, comparisons are between first and third ranked, and second and fourth ranked measures.  The last row 
compares first and fourth ranked measures. 
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Table 7 
Tests of incremental information content of EVA® components (HI): Returns measured over 5-year periodsa,b 
 
 
  Obs. Constant CFOt CFOt-1 Accrualt Accrualt-1 ATIntt ATIntt-1 CapChgt CapChgt-1 AcctAdjt AcctAdjt-1 Adj. R2 
Predicted signs:   + - + - - + - + + - 
 
 "5-Year Sums" 509 -.373 2.128 -.731 1.659 -.072 -.509 .089 -.088 .275 .549 .487 .3241 
 t-stat  -2.54 7.93 -2.56 5.99 -0.25 -0.11 0.17 -0.42 1.21 1.39 1.64 
 F-stat 33.16 18.01 0.01 0.81 2.75 
 p-valuec (.000) (.000) (.986) (.447) (.065) 
 
 
 
a Dependent variable = market-adjusted returns; independent variables (EVA components) are shown as column headings. 
 
b  Underlying regression is as follows: 
“5-year sums:” Dt = b0 + b1 ∑Xt/MVEt-5 + b2 ∑Xt-5/MVEt-5 + b3 ∑Xt/MVEt-5 + b4 ∑Xt-5/MVEt-5 +...+ b9 ∑Xt/MVEt-5 + b10 ∑Xt-5/MVEt-5 + et  
 
where ∑ is defined over the 5-year intervals, 1989-93 (non-lag) and 1984-88 (lagged) terms, respectively; Dt  = market-adjusted returns; Xt = a given EVA 
component, i.e., CFO, Accrual, ATInt, CapChg, and AcctAdj; and MVE = market value of equity three months following the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
c P-values in parentheses represent non-directional F-tests of the null hypothesis of no incremental information content (hypothesis HI).  
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Table 8 
Replication and extension of O’Byrne (1996): 
Tests of relative information content (HR) for EVA®, NOPAT and EBEI where the dependent 
variable is the market value of the firma 
 
  Observations  Relative Information Content  
 
 
 Rank order of R2  (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
Sample Size 5,843 EBEI > EVA > NOPAT 
 
 Adj. R2 0.5321 0.4965 0.4886 
 
 p-valueb (0.000) (0.413)  
 (0.000)   
 
 
a Underlying regression is from O’Byrne (1996):  
 MVt/capitalt-1  =  b0  +  b1 Y+t/capitalt-1  +  b2 Y-t/capitalt-1  +  b3 ln(capitalt-1)  +  bj Σ Ιj  +  et       (11) 
where MV = market value of debt and equity; Y = a given performance measure (EVA, NOPAT, NI) deflated by the 
firm’s cost of capital (as estimated by Stern Stewart), where + and - refer to positive and negative values of the 
performance measure, respectively; capitalt-1 = the firm’s beginning of period contributed capital; and I is a dummy 
variable representing industry membership. 
 Performance metrics are listed in order of R-squares from highest (on the left) to lowest (on the right).  Statistical 
tests of differences in explanatory power across performance measures are presented in parentheses below the adjusted 
R-squares.  See description of p-values below. 
 
b  Two-tailed p-values in parentheses represent tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between pairwise 
comparisons of adjusted R-squares (Biddle, Seow and Siegel 1995).  First row presents p-values for comparison 
between first and second ranked measures and second and third ranked measures.  On the next row, comparisons are 
between first and third ranked.  Tests based on Vuong (1989) are qualitatively identical.  
 
 
